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I. INTRODUCTION
According to recent Tokyo press reports, the United States and
Japan are once again at war-this time, though, it is a "Patent War."
Over the last decade, American companies have become extremely
aggressive in seeking worldwide protection from infringement of their
intellectual property. American corporations have recently focused
their efforts on the high-tech companies of Japan. These American
companies have gone beyond asserting U.S. patents against imports of
Japanese companies in the United States and are now actively pursu-
ing patent protection against Japanese companies in Japan itself.
Those Japanese companies, of course, are responding in kind, spend-
ing large amounts of money and labor on patent acquisition, both in
Japan and in the United States. As a result, the number of patent law-
suits between American and Japanese companies will likely increase
in the courts of both countries in the future. It is crucial, therefore,
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that American patent practitioners gain a thorough understanding of
both the Japanese patent prosecution system and the Japanese court
system in order to hold the current American advantage in this "Patent
War."
This understanding of the Japanese patent system can only be
achieved if Americans first acknowledge the fundamental differences
between Japanese and American culture. Today's Japan is a complex
hybrid of ancient Eastern and modem Western influences, preventing
us from stereotyping all Japanese as possessing a single view on pat-
ent enforcement. In fact, five very different views on the matter cur-
rently exist, each founded upon a different aspect of Japanese culture.
These views occupy the full spectrum from abolishing patents alto-
gether to strictly enforcing them. The cultural bases that give rise to
these views can be used to explain some of the primary differences
between Japanese and United States patent law and practice, both in
acquisition and litigation. Successful protection of American intellec-
tual property rights in Japan today is possible if Americans make the
effort to understand the constantly evolving cultural underpinnings of
Japanese patent law and practice.
II. CuRRENT EcoNoMic SIGNIFICANCE OF PATENTS
The current value of intellectual property is exemplified by suc-
cesses such as Honeywell's recent settlement of $127.5 million in
damages in their patent suit against Minolta over autofocus technol-
ogy.' In addition, Texas Instruments has received royalty income of
more than a billion dollars over the past five years from patent licens-
ing agreements with all of the major Japanese semiconductor manu-
facturers. Japanese businesses are finding themselves the target of
patent infringement suits, both in the United States and in Japan.
There are three primary reasons for this, the first and foremost being
that Japanese companies manufacture products in extremely large
volumes, creating a huge net sales base upon which per unit royalties
may be calculated. Second, there is currently an imbalance in the
ownership of valuable intellectual property rights in favor of Ameri-
can companies. Third, there is a "revenge factor" to be considered, as
many American companies who invented pioneering technology have
had Japanese companies "borrow"2 that technology and eventually
1. The Day Minolta Lost in Court, ToKyo TRIGGER, Aug. 1992, at 14-17 (Foreign Broad-
casting Information Service [hereinafter F.B.I.S.] trans.). See also, U.S. Patent Power Structure
Viewed, ToKYo TRIGGER, Aug. 1992, at 34-36 (F.B.I.S. trans.).
2. "The basic opinion of the U.S. was that anything that is born out of the intelligent
activities of human beings is to be protected. This was something that was impossible to under-
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gain higher market shares than the American inventor company. It is
no surprise then that a recent television show in Japan declared that
Japanese firms are currently defendants in 1,679 patent suits in the
United States.3
A. Successful Manufacturing = Large Potential Royalty Base
While Japan's greatest asset in the new global economy is un-
doubtedly its current manufacturing prowess, one of the United States'
greatest assets is its innovation. Many of the truly pioneering inven-
tions of the twentieth century were conceived by American inventors
and patented in the United States. Since most patent licensing agree-
ments provide that royalty payments are directly linked to sales of the
infringing goods, patent owners receive the largest royalty payments
from the most successful manufacturers. The massive manufacturing
machine comprising "Japan, Inc." is therefore a naturally attractive
target to owners of intellectual property rights.
B. Intellectual Property Ownership Imbalance
American companies are also aggressively enforcing their patents
against Japanese companies because of the imbalance which currently
exists between the United States and Japan in the possession of valua-
ble intellectual property rights.4 In 1991, American companies re-
ceived patent royalties and licensing fees from Japanese companies
totalling $3.2 billion.' In the same year, Japanese royalty receipts
from American companies totalled only $730 million.' In order to
take maximum advantage of this current imbalance, and "strike while
stand for Japanese people, who are permitted to 'borrow upon others' cleverness' in all matters."
Advanced, Developing Countries Battling Over Patents [hereinafter Advanced, Developing
Countries], ToKYo TRIGGER, Aug. 1992, at 32 (F.B.I.S. trans.).
3. Sunday Present: The Intellectual Property War-Last Trap by the Americans (Japa-
nese television broadcast, July 5, 1992) [hereinafter Intellectual Property War] (White Lily
trans.) (on file with the Santa Clara Computer and High Technology Law Journal). During this
broadcast, Akio Morita, the outspoken chairman of Sony Corporation, argued that the reason for
all of the suits against Japanese firms was not any of the three just mentioned, but rather that "the
Americans are finally realizing just how good the Japanese products are, and they are becoming
frightened.... mhe United States has been using intellectual property rights as a means, not
necessarily to beat Japan, but to protect the United States' economy from the Japanese econ-
omy." Id. at 2.
4. "Cases in which U.S. companies and inventors have brought suit against Japanese
corporations revolving around patent violations have become very frequent .... [T]he main
reason for this is laxity on the part of Japan in the development of creative technologies.. .. "
Canon's Chairman Criticizes U.S. Patent Lawsuits Against Japanese Companies, TOKYO NIHON
KEmZA Si-mBaUN, May 30, 1992, at 8 (F.B.I.S. trans.).
5. Bruce Stokes, Title Fights, 24 NAT'L. J. 1236 (1992).
6. Id
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the iron is hot," American companies have begun to pursue protection
of their intellectual property with new vigor directly in Japan, in addi-
tion to continuing their protection efforts in this country. The out-
come of this "Patent War" is uncertain, however, since Japanese
companies are aggressively seeking to shift the balance of intellectual
property rights to their favor.
In 1991, four out of the top five grantees of U.S. patents were
Japanese companies.7 This massive effort on the part of Japanese
companies to gain inroads into intellectual property protection in
America has not been matched by American companies obtaining
large numbers of Japanese patents. In fact, not one of the top fifty
grantees of Japanese patents in 1991 was a American company. By
amassing huge patent portfolios, Japanese corporations may soon be
able to offset many of the royalty claims from American corporations.
The surge in the number of patents granted to Japanese companies in
the last few years, in fact, has many American companies who have
received large royalty payments in the past worried that they will soon
be paying out royalties themselves.'
C. The "Revenge Factor"
Finally, Japanese companies are the current target of choice for
some U.S. patent holders due to the "revenge factor." Some American
companies today believe that the technology "borrowing" 9 committed
by Japanese companies in years past is at least partly responsible for
today's inequities in market shares between American and Japanese
companies. 10 They believe that Japan's large share of various markets
7. Furthermore, out of the top 50 patent grantees of U.S. patents, 19 were Japanese and
23 were American. Overall, Japanese companies received 33.5 percent of U.S. patents granted
in 1991, while American companies received 47.6 percent of them. See Table 1 in Appendix.
A large portion of activity in patent acquisition and litigation, both in this country and in
Japan, has involved the semiconductor industry. The impact of this industry in the area of patent
law is evidenced, for example, by the fact that 17 of the top 50 grantees of U.S. patents in 1991
manufactured semiconductors, 10 of which were Japanese companies. See Table 2 in Appendix.
In fact, the top three U.S. patent grantees last year were all Japanese companies which manufac-
ture semiconductors. Id. For this reason, when Japanese or American companies are mentioned
herein by way of example, they will primarily be semiconductor manufacturing companies.
8. An imbalance in the quantity of patents, however, does not necessarily translate into an
imbalance in royalty payments. According to Kensuke Norichika, general manager of Toshiba's
intellectual property division, "[Japanese] inventions, while legion, are more innovation than
breakthrough. The Japanese counter this weakness in making the great discoveries by seeking
necessary patents that are needed to manufacture future generations of a product." Richard
Meyer, Patent Management: Toshiba, FiNANcLAIL TIMES, Sept. 29, 1992, at 56.
9. See Advanced, Developing Countries, supra note 2, at 32.
10.
The Japanese are relative late-comers to intellectual property; hence they had few
patented technologies of their own. So they have taken a narrow view of the
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today is due to the lax enforcement of patents in the past. Prior to the
mid 1980s, patent enforcement was very weak, even in the United
States," and Japan was still generally considered to be behind the
United States in leading edge technology development. In order to
catch up as quickly as possible, some Japanese firms, rather than de-
velop a new product or method of producing a product, simply "bor-
rowed" existing technology from American companies and developed
small variations. By taking this underlying technology from Ameri-
can companies, these Japanese companies saved millions of dollars
and decades of time on research and development. This "leg up" on
American firms, the argument goes, then allowed these Japanese com-
panies to concentrate on small "tweaks" to their mass production man-
ufacturing techniques, thus enabling Japanese companies to
outperform, in both price and quality, the American companies who
invented the technology. The only way to correct past inequities, ac-
cording to some American companies, is to target their successful Jap-
anese competitors for large royalty payments today.
IL. PROTECTIONISM IN THE JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE
The Japanese Patent Office has long been criticized by Ameri-
cans for operating under protectionist policies. 2 Many American pat-
ent law practitioners believe that the Japanese Patent Office has an
active policy of preventing American inventors from obtaining mean-
ingful protection of intellectual*property in Japan. 3 This perception,
however true it may have been in the past, is no longer valid in today's
political and economic climate. It is possible for Americans to receive
valuable patent rights in Japan today. Furthermore, the favoritism pre-
viously thought to exist for Japanese applicants over foreign appli-
patents of others in order to work around them.... [Japanese] see patents of
technological breakthroughs as hurdles in their path in entering markets with
products that are based on such breakthroughs.
NHK Television Special Report: America's Patent Strategy, Targeting Japanese Business (NHK
Japanese television broadcast, Nov. 17, 1991) [hereinafter America's Patent Strategy] (U.S.
Embassy trans., Dec. 4, 1991, at 6) (on file with the Santa Clara Computer and High Technology
Law Journal).
11. The United States did not even have a court of appeals dedicated to hearing patent
cases until the establishment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982. See Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, §§ 126, 402, 96 Stat. 25, 37-39 (1982).
12. Thomas C. Hayes, Japan Grip Still Seen on Patents, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 24, 1989, at BI,
13. One of the primary methods used to achieve this end, which is often the subject of
complaints by Americans, is the opposition filing practice of the Japanese Patent Office. See
infra note 57. In the past, as will be discussed below, it was a common occurrence for many
patent applications filed by American companies to attract multiple oppositions from Japanese
companies immediately upon publication. At the same time, it was less common for a Japanese
company to file an opposition against a patent of another Japanese company.
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cants is currently on the decline. Today's new responsiveness to
American concerns is the result of a combination of economic and
political factors which will be discussed in section m. First, however,
an example will be given which illustrates why many American prac-
titioners believe that the Japanese-Patent Office actively practiced pro-
tectionism in the past.
A. The Kilby Patent
Jack St. Clair Kilby invented the integrated circuit in 1958 while
employed at Texas Instruments in Dallas, Texas. He filed a patent in
the United States on the invention on February 6, 1959, which issued
on June 23, 1964.14 A corresponding patent application was filed in
Japan on February 6, 1960.15 A patent based on this application was
finally granted by the Japanese Patent Office on October 30, 1989.16
It took the Japanese Patent Office almost thirty years after the original
Japanese application was filed to recognize'that Jack Kilby was enti-
tled to a patent on what may be the most important invention of the
twentieth century. The Berlin Wall rose and fell in less time than it
took the Japanese Patent Office to grant this patent.
Although the details of the delay and the reasons behind it will
probably never be publicly explained by the Japanese Patent Office, it
has been surmised that Japanese officials intentionally delayed the pat-
ent's issuance in order to avoid harming the then-fledgling semicon-
ductor industry in Japan. Even in the 1960s, this industry was
projected to be extremely profitable and eventually to become a cru-
cial part of the Japanese economy. To date, three years after the issu-
ance of the patent, Texas Instruments has received no plausible
explanation for the thirty year delay. The file folder on the patent is
filled with unexplainable actions by the Japanese Patent Office. Cor-
respondence was claimed to have been lost by Japanese examiners,
examiners were mysteriously transferred off of the case, fees were
claimed to have not been paid, and files were misplaced. There were
even long periods of no activity at all. At one point, seven years
elapsed without any response from the Japanese Patent Office after
Texas Instruments filed a petition for accelerated prosecution of the
patent.
14. U.S. Patent No. 3,138,743, Kilby, inventor (June 23, 1964).
15. The Japanese application claimed a priority date of February 6, 1959 under the Paris
Convention Treaty. See 35 U.S.C. § 119 (1988).
16. A divisional of the first Japanese patent application was filed in Japan on January 30,
1964. This divisional was eventually abandoned, but another divisional was filed from it on
December 21, 1971. This second divisional was the patent which was finally issued by the
Japanese Patent Office on October 30, 1989.
1994]
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In addition to these office action delays, another roadblock was
thrown in the path of the Kilby patent. At the time of filing, Japanese
patent law stated that a patent was enforceable for fifteen years from
the date of publication for opposition. The new law, enacted after the
Kilby patent had been buried in the Japanese Patent Office for several
years, held that patents were enforceable for the shorter of: 1) fifteen
years from the date of publication for opposition, or 2) twenty years
from the filing date. The Japanese Patent Office, which had not yet
examined the Kilby patent enough to publish it for opposition, argued
that the new law applied to it, and thus the patent would expire by law
before they even completed its examination. Naturally, Texas Instru-
ments fought this interpretation of the law, and they eventually won
the right to have the application "grandfathered" under the old law.
Despite this success, the application still had not advanced enough in
the Japanese Patent Office to be published for opposition. Texas In-
struments continued to fight further delays until it was published in
1986. Immediately, twelve oppositions were filed, including one from
every major semiconductor corporation in Japan. Eventually, all op-
positions were cleared, and the patent was granted on October 30,
1989. The Kilby patent now expires on November 27, 2001 (15 years
after it was published for opposition), and covers every single inte-
grated circuit made, used, or sold in Japan.
Despite numerous past complaints from American companies re-
garding procedures of the Japanese Patent Office, 7 the Kilby case
represents one of the longest delays in patent prosecution in the his-
tory of the Japanese Patent Office. It may be impossible to prove a
government-industry conspiracy existed in this case, but it is difficult
to ignore that possibility. Ironically, Texas Instruments actually
benefitted from the delay. If the patent had been issued in the late
1960s, for example, it would have expired in the early 1980s. During
this period, the production of semiconductors in Japan was only a
fraction of what it is today; 8 therefore, the royalty base would have
been correspondingly smaller. Also, as previously mentioned, patent
enforcement was very lax prior to the mid-1980s, and therefore roy-
17. The single most frustrating aspect of applying for a Japanese patent, according to
American practitioners, is the huge delay from application to grant. While it takes the United
States Patent Office only 18 months to grant or finally reject the average patent application, it
takes the Japanese Patent Office five to seven years to do the same. Three main factors are
responsible for this large delay: 1) the huge number of applications filed by Japanese companies
on trivial improvements of existing inventions, which chokes the patent office with the sheer
volume of paperwork, 2) the vastly understaffed examiners department, and 3) the opposition
procedure of Japanese patent law. Hayes, supra note 12, at BI-B2.
18. In 1989, for example, when the patent was granted, sales of integrated circuits in Japan
totalled $20.8 billion, 90% of which ($18.6 billion) were sales by Japanese companies. Id. at BI.
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alty rates were much lower than those currently accepted. Due to the
delay, some analysts have estimated that the annual royalties from this
single patent could reach $800 million dollars.19
B. Today's Climate
As a whole, the Japanese government undeniably promotes poli-
cies that can only be described as protectionist. In many areas of in-
dustry, such as construction, this protectionism is so pervasive that
markets in Japan are, for all practical purposes, closed to American
companies. While American companies have been working hard to
level the playing field, the Japanese government has generally acted
slowly to reform. The Japanese Patent Office, however, is setting pre-
cedent in this regard, although much improvement is still desired.20
The Kilby case can be viewed, obviously, as supporting the opin-
ions of some American patent practitioners that an anti-American bias
is built into Japan's patent system. The case can also be viewed,
though, as a clear indicator that the environment in Japan is changing
and that the Japanese Patent Office is becoming more responsive to
the concerns of American businesses.21 After the Japanese Patent Of-
fice had refused for almost thirty years to grant the Kilby patent, there
seemed to be no reason for them to suddenly do so. The action sur-
prised everyone, even the attorneys who had spent large portions of
their careers at Texas Instruments prosecuting the patent. Speculation
exists that external political and economic pressure may have placed
the decision to grant the patent outside of the patent office. Several
factors responsible for this pressure continue to influence the Japanese
Patent Office into becoming more receptive to the concerns of Ameri-
can companies.
The gigantic trade deficit between the Japan and the United
States underlies every aspect of relations between the two countries.
While the Japanese naturally desire to maintain their trade advantage,
they are well aware that Americans are extremely concerned with the
size of the trade deficit, and this issue has become a genuine public
19. Id.
20. One point of particular concern to American intellectual property rights owners should
be the recent announcement of the Japanese Patent Office (JPO) to hold a symposium in
America with the stated goal of "sound[ing] the alarm on 'excessive patent protection policy'
[of the U.S.]." Subtly, the article which announced this symposium stated that the JPO knows
that "it is possible to work on the U.S. government indirectly." Patent Office Considering Bos-
ton Conference to Address U.S. "Excessive Patent Protection", Nitm SAoo SmMBtm, April
5, 1993 (F.B.I.S. trans.).
21. "'This [Kilby] patent took too long to obtain, but perhaps it is a sign that the dam has
broken,'" Hayes, supra note 12, at B2 (quoting Alfred E. Hirsch, Assistant General Counsel for
Intellectual Property at American Telephone and Telegraph Company's Bell Laboratories).
1994]
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relations difficulty for Japan.2 2 The political pressure that the United
States has exerted on Japan to lower this deficit, as well as the recent
increase in "Japan bashing" by the American public, has given Japan a
heightened sensitivity to American concerns. Sony Chairman Akio
Morita recognizes that "Japan is a country with no energy and no nat-
ural resources, so we must be able to sell our products to other coun-
tries in order to survive."'23 Responsiveness to the concerns of the
United States is necessary for the future of Japan's economy, so the
entire government of Japan is under pressure to eliminate
protectionism.
The Japanese Patent Office has been more willing to change its
protectionist policies than other branches of the Japanese government
due to the firm stance taken by the Reagan and Bush administrations
on intellectual property. This position was first communicated to Ja-
pan in a report entitled "Competition with the Whole World-The
New Reality," released in 1985.24 This report was considered "shock-
ing"'  in Japan; since they had relied for decades on being able to
"borrow" American technology at will during the prior period of lax
patent enforcement. Since the release of this report, every significant
trade negotiation with Japan has placed intellectual property enforce-
ment as a major plank in the United States platform. In fact, President
Bush, through his Council on Competitiveness, placed increased scru-
tiny on the policies and procedures of the Japanese Patent Office. In
May of 1989, dissatisfied with the adequacy of the Japanese proce-
dures, he placed Japan on the United States "watch list" of 17 coun-
tries that had denied effective patent protection for American
inventions.26 If sufficient progress is not made within a specified pe-
riod, trade sanctions will follow. This announcement was a major em-
barrassment to Japan, and they have since increased the staff of
22. Atsushi Kusano, a professor of Politics and International Relations at Keio University,
said, "I think the biggest problem' is that [the deficit and] the overall Japan-United States rela-
tions have a significant influence over juries' decisions. At the time Honeywell v. Minolta was
[decided] ... we can't deny that this may have had a negative influence on the result of the trial
[Honeywell received damages of $127.5 million]." Intellectual Property War, supra note 3, at
8.
23. Id. at 22.
24. This report was the work of the Committee on Industrial Competitiveness headed by
the then-president of Hewlett-Packard, John Young. Commonly referred to as the "Young Re-
port," the document urged American government to actively persuade foreign governments to
strengthen their intellectual property laws. Many Japanese believe that this was the beginning of
the current "Patent War," and that it "led to radical revisions of the [U.S.] government's indus-
trial policy." Advanced, Developing Countries, supra note 2, at 31.
25. Intellectual Property War, supra note 3, at 12.
26. Hayes, supra note 12, at B2.
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examiners in the patent office and made attempts to streamline their
operations.2 7
Another factor that has improved the perceived fairness of the
Japanese Patent Office to Americans has nothing to do with political
pressure, but arises instead from marketplace economics. For many
years, the time between application and issuance of patents in Japan
was longer for an American applicant than for a Japanese applicant,
primarily due to the common practice of Japanese companies to file
oppositions only against American applications.28 This practice has
changed substantially in the last few years, however, as Japanese com-
panies have begun to follow the lead of American businesses. Several
Japanese companies have initiated patent battles with other Japanese
companies. Today, in fact, some Japanese firms file oppositions
against other Japanese companies' applications as often as they file
oppositions against applications of American companies. This aspect
of the decline of protectionism can be attributed solely to economics,
as some Japanese companies have learned from Americans that patent
enforcement can be a billion dollar industry. This pro-patent enforce-
ment attitude, however, is not shared by all Japanese companies, as
will be discussed below.
IV. JAPANESE VIEws ON PATENT ENFORCEMENT
As mentioned earlier, it is essential that Americans understand
the Japanese perspective on patent enforcement in order to acquire and
defend intellectual property rights successfully in Japan. A wide spec-
trum of views on this subject currently exists in Japanese society and
industry, and it is critical that Americans become sensitive to each of
these perspectives before entering negotiations of intellectual property
rights in Japan.
A. Anti-Enforcement Approach
A central tenet of Confucianism is that an idea cannot be owned
but must be shared. The very idea of intellectual property rights being
tied up in a single individual or company is therefore alien to ancient
Japanese culture. Akio Morita, Chairman of Sony Corporation,
summed up the disdain which many Japanese feel toward American
enforcement of intellectual property rights by saying that:
Americans have a broader perspective on ideas than the Japanese.
When I was living in the United States, my child, got sick, so I
27. Id.
28. See supra note 13.
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called my doctor. Our American doctor gave us instructions on
what to do and what kind of medication to take. Now in Japan, you
wouldn't expect anything else to happen-but in the States, I re-
ceived a bill for that telephone call from my doctor. Now, this tells
you that they don't give out any intelligence for free.29
Japanese companies have spent most of the post-World War II
years playing "catch up" technologically. Some benefitted greatly,
therefore, from "borrowing" technology from the United States during
the long period of lax patent enforcement which occurred prior to the
mid-1980s. Having relied on American companies to provide expen-
sive research and development for their products for so many years,
these Japanese companies concentrated their efforts and resources on
developing minor manufacturing improvements, not on creating pio-
neering technology breakthroughs. The renewed vigor in the assertion
of patent rights against the Japanese in recent years, therefore, has sent
them scrambling to dramatically increase their own research and de-
velopment expenditures. This anti-patent enforcement attitude is un-
derstandable in this light, since strict patent enforcement can only
harm, not benefit, Japanese businesses in the short term.30
B. Conciliatory, Relationship-Building Approach
A different view on the subject of patent enforcement emphasizes
that strong business relationships are more important than patent dis-
putes. The possibility of forming joint ventures and other business
arrangements in the long term future are more important than present
squabbles over temporary cash payments. Therefore, companies es-
pousing this view will typically pay whatever is reasonably asked of
them in order to preserve future relationships. These companies be-
lieve that all disputes, not just those involving patent rights, should be
resolved as quickly as possible in order to minimize unhealthy friction
between American and Japanese companies.3 ' This view is based
29. Intellectual Property War, supra note 3, at 7-8.
30. The influence of this view can be seen throughout the Japanese Patent Office laws and
procedure. One example of this is the extremely long delay between application and issuance of
a patent in Japan. Since the limited term of enforceability of a patent begins to run as of its filing
date in Japan, a lengthy examination will result in a short enforcement period. Additionally,
under Japanese patent law, patent claims are to be interpreted very narrowly, and often if the
technology has changed even slightly from the time of invention, the patent is found not to be
infringed. Therefore, even if a patentee is able to file suit during this short period of enforceabil-
ity, it is very difficult to convince a Japanese court that any product or process currently being
marketed infringes a patent which was drafted years earlier. This amounts, therefore, to a virtual
de facto freedom of ideas in many cases. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.




upon the Japanese cultural belief that a general state of harmony, or
wa, should always exist, rather than one of conflict.
In general, the Japanese believe that Americans are simply too
litigious.32 A Japanese moderator of a business roundtable discussion
on intellectual property declared that
in the United States, there are 800,000 lawyers as opposed to
17,000 in Japan. . . . When there is a crime or lawsuit [in
America], attorneys come running, and when there is an accident,
attorneys arrive before the policeman. When a plane crashes, I hear
more than 2,000 lawyers gather around. . . . [The total annual
revenue for American legal firms is around $100 Billion:... That
is incredible. 33
Keio University Professor Kusano reiterated this view by saying that
Americans "use courts and lawyers for very insignificant things. To
them, it is an everyday affair, whereas we think of it as a last resort. 34
Companies embracing this view are willing to pay the royalties
American companies demand for an additional reason, however.
These companies firmly believe that any company that overempha-
sizes patent royalties is an ineffective competitor. For example, Ken-
suke Norichika of Toshiba, the number one grantee of U.S. patents in
1991,11 believes that "[o]ur competitiveness is not threatened as long
as American companies' attention is on income from intellectual prop-
erty rights [and not from manufacturing profits]. 36  This feeling is
shared by NEC. "When a company starts relying heavily on patent
revenue and income from technology transfers, it's time to start selling
shares in the finm,' 37 according to former vice president of NEC,
Michiyuki Uenohara. The Japanese newspapers are also becoming
sharply critical of overly aggressive assertion of patents. One paper
At present, 7000 Japanese firms have made inroads into the U.S., but in contrast,
only 200 U.S. firms are in Japan. From these figures we can understand the back-
ground behind the tendency for an increasingly anti-Japanese complex in the U.S.
If U.S., European, and ASEAN firms were to suddenly make inroads into Japan
like that, surely Japanese people would not be able to hide their feelings. The
muttering of U.S. government officials that "Japan is overdoing it" is only natural.
United States Develops Patents as Weapons, ToKYo TucER, Aug. 1992, at 18-22 (F.B.I.S.
trans.).
32. In fact, a recent Japanese television show estimated that there are currently more than
1.7 million lawsuits per year in the United States including patent violations. Intellectual Prop-
erty War, supra note 3, at 2.
33. Id. at 3, 18.
34. Id. at 8.
35. See Table 1 in Appendix.
36. Koichi Nishioka, Disputing Patents Reveals Weakness, NiKKai WaEEKI.y, Aug. 15,
1992, at 11. Norichika is the head of the intellectual property asset division at Toshiba Corp.
37. Id.
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criticized the pro-litigation strategy of American companies as an "ex-
cessive dependence [on a] legacy of past technological superiority. 38
Another Japanese paper warned that this "patent dependence disease"
which currently infects American firms "will encourage conflict,
rather than invention. 39
C. Aggressive Litigant Approach
At least a few Japanese companies strongly disagree with both of
the views previously discussed and take an aggressive pro-patent en-
forcement approach that rivals the strategy of many American firms.40
Fujitsu and Mitsubishi are included in this category, and recent negoti-
ations over intellectual property rights reveal the companies' prefer-
ence for full-blown litigation over negotiated settlement. "Intellectual
property rights can only be established through litigation," stresses
Todayoshi Homma, general manger of Mitsubishi Electric Corpora-
tion's Intellectual Property Licensing Department.41 Fujitsu has taken
an even stronger pro-patent enforcement approach by establishing a
reputation in Japan as one of the few Japanese companies that seems
to have no qualms about suing other Japanese companies over patent
disputes.42
These companies have taken patent acquisition procedures to
new heights in order to produce valuable patent portfolios to assert
against competitors. For example, extremely time-consuming proce-
dures are now required of inventors in Mitsubishi plants in America.
At the end of each workday, every engineer must have all of his day's
work product, sketches, conceptual diagrams, computer program
printouts, and notes signed, dated, and notarized in order to establish
the date of conception, just in case a patent dispute arises sometime in
the future involving that work.43
38. Stokes, supra note 5, at 1236.
39. Id.
40.
In the past, Japanese corporations were often not very enthusiastic about manag-
ing and exercising rights once patents have been applied for and patent rights
have been registered. After their experience in the United States, Japanese corpo-
rations are now carefully moving in the direction of aggressively exercising patent
rights they own.
Naoki Mizutani, Recent Disputes Involving Japanese Corporations and Future Strategies, JAPAN
SocrTr oF PaRcisioN ENGINEERiNo, Feb. 3, 1993, at 1-3 (F.B.I.S. trans.).
41. Riochi Yada, Companies Moving to Defend Intellectual Property Rights, NIKKEI
WEEKLY, Aug. 22, 1992, at 8.
42. Intellectual Property War, supra note 3, at 20.
43. Yada, supra note 41.
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D. "Sale of an Asset" Approach
Another pro-patent enforcement view, although shared by a small
minority of Japanese companies, places the value of intellectual prop-
erty rights on par with all other physical assets of the company. This
approach is exemplified by Hitachi. Hitachi salespeople actually mar-
ket and sell the company's patents to outside companies or individu-
als. Hitachi has consistently been among the top three grantees of
both United States and Japanese patents for some time now, resulting
in the formation of a huge patent portfolio. In addition to granting
traditional patent licenses to competitors, they have actively sold en-
tire patents to outside companies" when management decides that
Hitachi does not wish to engage in manufacturing the particular tech-
nology involved in the patent. These efforts resulted in a total patent-
related income of $109 million last year, which accounted for about
ten percent of the company's total profits for the year.45
E. "Nuclear Bomb" Approach
An extremist view, beginning to gain support in Japan, is that the
over-enforcement of patents by American companies will lead to a
devastation equivalent to that of a full-scale military war. A video
docu-drama entitled 'The Intellectual Property War-Last Trap by
the Americans" was broadcast on Japanese television on July 5,
1992.46 This video is set in the first decade of the twenty-first century.
It paints a bleak picture of the aftermath of the economic war between
Japan and the United States, in which neither side is declared the win-
ner, but all high technology has been destroyed by over-enforcement
of patent rights.47 The underlying suggestion is that the United States
started this destruction by charging such exorbitant royalty rates on its
44. A license agreement can be thought of a "rental" of the right to use the invention
embodied in the patent, whereas a sale of a patent is a legal assignment of the entire patent to the
buyer. The buyer then has the right to go out and license others, including the seller, to use the
invention embodied in the patent.
45. Yada, supra note 41.
46. Intellectual Property War, supra note 3. An earlier broadcast aired on November 17,
1991 had a similar theme; American inventors were depicted as "greedy technology-mono-
polizers." America's Patent Strategy, supra note 10, at 1.
47. The broadcast began with the following statement by the Japanese moderator
[Tihere is a "nuclear bomb" about to explode which could destroy the world.
This bomb is called intellectual property rights.... The United States is engaging
in this war to recover from its trade deficit and other economic impoverishment,
however, this dispute or war-if taken to the extreme, could lead to a stoppage of
world production where no one is willing to produce and [this] could lead to
world disaster. This is a simulation of the worst case of the disaster that is about
to come true.
Intellectual Property War, supra note 3, at 1.
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patents that eventually Japanese industry could no longer afford to
export any goods to the United States. The loss of this major market
caused all of the high tech industries to close, resulting in massive
unemployment. Similarly, the video asserts, American companies in
economic trouble discovered that they could make more short term
money by heavily enforcing their patents, and thereby generating large
royalty income, than they could through manufacturing. Eventually,
therefore, they stopped production altogether and relied upon a slowly
drying up well of intellectual property rights developed in the previous
decade.
The "simulation" follows an American reporter who is visiting
Japan to survey the post-"Patent War" damage. He visits factories
that had long been closed and some that are on the brink of bank-
ruptcy. None contain the high tech, robot-dominated assembly lines
of "Japan, Inc." that are so publicized today. At one factory, the
American reporter speaks to a worker named Kei. Kei has a postgrad-
uate degree, apparently in manufacturing or production engineering,
yet due to the lack of high tech production jobs, he has to work as a
manual laborer at one-fourth of the salary he received before "the
great collapse."48 The simulation concludes with the American say-
ing, "Now there is a widening crevasse between those who produce
knowledge and those who produce goods. And the structure of this
divide is beyond the control of our leaders .... Weren't intellectual
property rights supposed to protect the very spirit of initiative?"4 9
A roundtable discussion accompanied this simulation, with pan-
elists from academia, industry, and government, including Professor
Atsushi Kusano, a specialist in politics and international relations at
Keio University, Akio Morita, 50 chairman of Sony Corporation, and
Makita Shimokawa, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Morita
agreed with the general theme of the "simulation," stating that "pro-
duction/manufacturing, or adding value to raw materials, creates the
48. Kei tells the American that he believes "Japan and the United States were pursuing an
outdated dream. If you didn't have to produce anything and could make money on ideas and on
more of an intellectual labor, why would anyone bother to do this kind of work [manual assem-
bly labor]-if you can get away with it?" Id. at 3.
49. Id. at 22.
50. Akio Morita is well known for taking extremist political positions. In 1989, he co-
authored the recently banned book, The Japan That Can Say No, along with former Cabinet
member Shintaro Ishihara. One of his contentions was that supremacy in semiconductors has
given Japan a power that they could have used to change the military balance between the United
States and the former Soviet Union, merely by denying leading edge semiconductors to one
superpower and furnishing them to the other. The mere fact that Japan would consider doing
this, after the United States had rebuilt Japan after World War H and established their technologi-
cal position today, disturbed many Americans. SHINTARO ISHIHARA, Tn JAPAN THAT CAN SAY
No (Frank Baldwin trans., 1991).
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core of any economy. If everyone wanted to live by selling ideas and
patents, I think it would be a disaster."'" For an opposing point of
view, supposedly typical of American companies today, the panel
cited Mel Sharp, former General Patent Counsel at Texas Instruments
and current president of Innovation Strategies, an intellectual property
consulting firm. Mr. Sharp was quoted as saying that
[I]ntellectual property rights have become the key factor in corpo-
rate competitiveness. Those who are creative or original will
win-those who can only imitate will disappear. I think that is
good. If you want to compete in the business world, you must in-
vest in R&D and own your own intellectual property rights. If you
don't do that-you won't be able to survive in the future.52
Apparently, the panel disagreed with this statement, believing strongly
that businesses can survive, and even thrive, through imitation and
slight modification.
It is difficult to say which of these five positions on intellectual
property rights is currently the most prevalent in Japan. It is even
more difficult to predict which will prevail ten years from now, for
Japan is in a constant, if slow, state of flux. It is therefore important
for American practitioners to recognize the existence and influence of
each of these views throughout Japan.
V. PATENT PROSECUTION IN JAPAN
Once United States patent practitioners have acknowledged both
the wide spectrum of views in Japan regarding patent enforcement and
the current trend away from protectionism by the Japanese Patent Of-
fice, many of the differences between the United States and Japan, in
both patent law and practice, can be more easily understood.
A. Differences Between United States and Japanese Patent
Law
Much literature exists on the prosecution of patents in Japan,53
and this discussion is not intended to be an exhaustive presentation of
how to comply with the Japanese patent code. While Japanese patent
law is very similar to United States patent law in many respects, for
51. Intellectual Property War, supra note 3, at 14.
52. Id. at 16.
53. See, e.g. Takashi Ishida, Helpful Hints to Effective Japanese Patent Protection, in PAT-
ENTs, CopyRiGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LrrERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES,
GLOBAL INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY SERmS: PRACnCAL STRATEGIES-PATENT, 319 PLI/PAT 93
(1991), PLI Order #G4-3871; Tetsu Tanabe and Harold C. Wegner, Japanese Patent Law, 58 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc. 565 (1976); Japanese Patent Practice: Prosecution/Litigation, AIPLA PRoC.
(1992).
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example in the requirements of utility, novelty, and non-obviousness,
many important differences exist. The focus of the discussion here
will be on the differences that have proved the most difficult to re-
solve in world patent law harmonization efforts (such as the GATT
negotiations, Uruguay round) and their effects on current patent nego-
tiations between American and Japanese companies.
1. First-to-File vs. First-to-Invent
Perhaps the single most glaring difference between the two coun-
tries' laws relates to establishing the priority of an invention. In Ja-
pan, the first inventor to file an application on the invention in the
Japanese Patent Office owns the rights to that invention. United
States law, on the other hand, holds that the first person to invent the
subject matter of the patent owns the rights to the invention. Although
the United States is in the clear minority here, 4 American practition-
ers and inventors strongly believe that this concept is by far the more
equitable. Although "first-to-file" is infinitely simpler from an admin-
istrative viewpoint, it seems inherently unfair to make valuable patent
rights depend entirely on how quickly an inventor's attorney can file
the required paperwork in a patent application.
2. Patent Term Limits
A second major difference in the patent laws of the two nations is
the length of enforceability of patents. The term of a standard utility
patent in the United States is seventeen years, measured from the issue
date of the patent, regardless of how long it took the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office to examine and grant the patent.55 The term is com-
pletely unrelated to thefiling date of the patent. In Japan, on the other
hand, the lifespan of a patent is the shorter of: 1) fifteen years from
the date of publication for opposition, or 2) twenty years from the
filing date. As discussed above,56 linking the term of the patent's en-
forceability to the filing date effectively allows the patent office to
dictate the length of that term through hastening or delaying the exam-
ination process.
3. Pre-issue Publication vs. Absolute Pre-Issue Secrecy
A patent application filed in Japan is automatically published, or
"laid open," for inspection by the general public eighteen months from
54. The United States and the Philippines are the only two countries in the world that have
"first-to-invent" rather than "first-to-file" laws.
55. 35 U.S.C. § 154.
56. See supra note 30.
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the earlier of the Japanese filing date or the foreign convention priority
date.57 This publication, called a Kokai, entitles the applicant to a
right of compensation under certain conditions for the subsequent use
of the invention by third parties, but only if a patent is eventually
issued on the application.58 Additionally, the pending application is
published a second time before issuance in Japan, as a Kokoku. This
second publication, or "publication for opposition," occurs after the
patent office examiners have fully investigated the prior art and have
found nothing that would bar the issuance of the patent. The Kokoku
is essentially an invitation for companies who would'be affected by
the issuance of the patent to attempt to do a better job than the exam-
iners were able to do in undermining its validity.
Under United States law, on the other hand, the examiners are
solely responsible for discovering all of the relevant prior art, and pat-
ent applications are held in strict secrecy until issuance. Even the file
on a finally rejected application is sealed from public inspection.
Many American inventors see this secrecy as a distinct advantage over
the Japanese procedure.
4. Deferred Examination
In Japan, a patent application is examined only after a request for
examination is filed. This request must be filed within seven years of
the filing date of the application, or else the application is deemed
withdrawn. The United States has no corresponding procedure, as all
applications filed are automatically examined. Many American practi-
tioners and inventors see the Japanese procedure as desirable due to
the high cost of working a patent completely through the United States
Patent and Trademark Office. In today's world of rapidly changing
technology, using a deferred examination procedure would benefit an
applicant greatly since he could wait up to seven years to see if any
competitors are using his invention before spending any more money
prosecuting a patent on it. Adopting this system would, however,
likely require an adoption of a publication procedure similar to Ja-
pan's, in order to further the United States patent law's goal of
disclosure.
57. Patent Law, art. 65 (Japan).
58. Patent Law, art. 65 bis (Japan).
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B. Differences Between United States and Japanese Patent
Practice
In addition to an understanding of the major differences in the
patent laws of the United States and Japan, an understanding of the
differences in the practice of patent law in the two countries can be
invaluable in negotiating patent disputes in Japan.
1. Authorized Practitioners
In the United States, only patent attorneys and patent agents are
authorized to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark
Office. Admission to the Patent Bar requires passing the rigorous Pat-
ent Bar Examination, which often has a pass rate of less than fifty
percent. Only individuals who have taken and passed a certain mini-
mum number of college hours of physics, chemistry, or engineering
are allowed to even sit for the examination. In Japan, on the other
hand, both Bengoshi (regular attorneys-at-law with no special training
or testing) and Benrishi (patent "agents" who are not lawyers and who
are not required to meet any educational, training, or testing require-
ments) are authorized to practice law before the Japanese Patent Of-
fice. Many American practitioners believe that the lack of technical
educational and testing requirements for Japanese practitioners ad-
versely affects the quality of all Japanese patents, and further tilts the
scales of valuable intellectual property ownership in favor of the
United States.
2. Corporate Organization
In the United States, it is common for large corporations to prose-
cute the majority of their own patent applications through in-house
patent attorneys and agents. Texas Instruments, for example, cur-
rently employs twenty-nine patent attorneys and seventeen patent
agents. All but two of these are located at the company's headquarters
in Dallas, Texas. Due to a general shortage of patent attorneys in the
United States, there is a relatively high turnover of employees in many
corporate patent departments, and this has forced corporations to pay
higher salaries to patent attorneys in order to keep them on board.
Limited legal department budgets have thus limited the number of pat-
ent attorneys employed by each American corporation.
In Japan, however, the situation is entirely different. Fujitsu, for
example, has a staff of 150 "patent attorneys" 9 and Toshiba employs
over 400 Benrishi to prosecute the company's patents. Because they
59. America's Patent Strategy, supra note 10, at 2.
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are not attomeys-at-law, the salary requirements of Benrishi are rela-
tively low.6 0 Also, there is not much of a national demand for
Benrishi, since virtually anyone can become one, so company loyalty
is very high, with practically no employee turnover.6" Toshiba's
Benrishi are decentralized, with only seventy located at the company's
headquarters. Three are always located in New York City for training,
as are two in Washington, D.C. The remaining 325 are scattered with
research and development groups throughout the various technical de-
partments of the company.62
Although the United States should lower neither its educational
nor examination requirements for membership in the United States
Patent Bar, American companies could benefit from following the
lead of Japanese companies in decentralizing their patent staffs. Phys-
ically locating patent attorneys and agents in close proximity to engi-
neers involved in research and development would allow closer
working relationships to develop between inventors and in-house
counsel. Such an arrangement would also increase the efficiency of
the attorney or agent by thoroughly familiarizing them with the tech-
nology. This decentralization, along with the size, low salary, and low
mobility of the patent staff of Japanese companies explains their abil-
ity to file far more patent applications than their American
competitors.
3. Acquisition Strategy
In 1991, a total of 178,083 patent applications were filed in the
United States,63 while more than 300,000 patent applications were
filed in Japan.' Due to the labor and financial constraints of Ameri-
can companies discussed above, many limit their patent applications
to only those that internal management deems truly important. Texas
Instruments, for example, files patent applications on approximately
one third of the invention disclosures it receives from its engineers.
The corporation's patent department is able to file only about 450 ap-
plications per year in the United States and 245 per year in Japan.65
Fujitsu filed 1,000 patent applications in Japan in the month of Sep-
60. See generally id.
61. Id.
62. Meyer, supra note 8, at 57.
63. Telephone interview with Oscar G. Matsin, Public Information Specialist, Office of
Public Affairs, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Oct. 26, 1992).
64. Nishioka, supra note 36.
65. It is the author's experience that Texas Instruments is granted about 375 U.S. patents
per year and only about 25 Japanese patents per year.
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tember 1991 alone. 6 With their advantage in large, inexpensive, loyal
patent staffs, Japanese companies such as Fujitsu and Toshiba can af-
ford to file patent applications on virtually every idea their engineers
conceive.67 Toshiba itself is ranked number one among United States
patent grantees, receiving over 1000 U.S. patents per year.68
VI. PATENT LITIGATION IN JAPAN
As outlined above, an American company can effectively obtain
patent rights in Japan, as long as it is equipped with an understanding
of both the spectrum of philosophical viewpoints of the Japanese to-
wards intellectual property protection and the differences between the
United States and Japanese patent systems. However, as previously
discussed, many Japanese feel that technology should be shared with
society, not restricted or impeded by western ideals of personal prop-
erty rights. This philosophy has often led Japanese companies to use
American intellectual property without regard to patent rights. An
American owner of a Japanese patent may need to bring a patent in-
fringement lawsuit against the Japanese infringer in order to protect
these rights. The remainder of this article introduces the critical as-
pects of the Japanese legal system that the American patentee will
need to understand in order to bring a successful patent infringement
action in Japan.
A. The Courts
An important initial requirement for successfully litigating a pat-
ent infringement action in the courts of Japan is for the foreign paten-
tee to understand the structure of the Japanese legal system.
1. Historical Background
The end of the Shogunite period in 1867 signalled the end of over
seven hundred years of military rule in Japan. The new civilian gov-
ernment spent much of the second half of the nineteenth century de-
veloping a new legal system to replace the military system. Japan has
a history of incorporating foreign policies and ideas into its own soci-
ety; so accordingly, when the new civilian government reformed the
civil and penal codes, it based them primarily on translations of
French and German Codes.69 Because of these influences, the current
66. America's Patent Strategy, supra note 10, at 2.
67. See Meyer, supra note 8.
68. Id.




civil court system has many similarities to European civil law. For
example, there are no jury trials, and the presentation of issues and
evidence is controlled by judges. Although the United States influ-
enced the legal system after World War II, a present day hearing in
Japan is more a formal presentation of written documents than an ad-
versarial proceeding.
2. District Courts: The Primary Trial-Level Courts
Japan has a single national court system as opposed to the dual
system of state and federal courts in the United States. The primary
trial level courts of the Japanese system are the District Courts, which
possess original jurisdiction over patent infringement cases. There are
a total of fifty District Courts in Japan, at least one for each prefecture,
in which a patent suit can be initiated.70 Due to their complexity, a
patent case is typically tried by three judges, one being the "judge in
charge," or Shunin. This judge will sign, and usually write, the judg-
ment and opinion. If a provisional injunction is sought, the Shunin
will typically handle the injunction proceeding, or Karishobun.
Because of the large number of businesses in their districts, the
Tokyo District Court and Osaka District Court handle seventy to
eighty percent of the patent infringement cases in Japan.7 1 Both
courts have special divisions that exclusively handle patent cases. The
special divisions have access to scientific advisors at the Japanese Pat-
ent Office, who advise the judges on technical issues. The court may
also appoint a completely independent and unbiased technical expert
to look at relevant issues. These special divisions have given the To-
kyo and Osaka District Courts significant experience with patent law.
In an area of law that is extremely complex and highly specialized,
this is clearly a great advantage to all parties involved in a patent in-
fringement suit.72
70. Although all District Courts have subject matter jurisdiction, to maintain the suit in a
District Court, that court must also have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. This requires
that the infringer reside in the district or that the infringing acts occurred in the district.
71. Masuji Hara & Masashige Ohba, Patent Litigation, in JAPANESE PATENT AND TRADE-
MARK LAW: AcQUIsmION, LIcENsING AND PRoTEcrIoN PL3 (Seminar Services, Int'l., et al., eds.,
1976).
72. There are no such special divisions to handle patent cases in the U.S. District Court.
The creation of such special divisions has clearly produced efficiency and uniformity in Japanese
patent suits, and many American practitioners view the Japanese system more desirable than
their own in this regard.
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3. High Court: The Appellate Court
Decisions of the District Court are appealed to the High Court,
which is the first level appellate court. A panel of three judges may
review not only the arguments from below, but also new evidence. In
the Tokyo District, there is a special division of the High Court that
hears patent appeals from the special patent divisions of the District
Court.73
4. Supreme Court: The Court of Last Resort
The second appeal is taken to the Japanese Supreme Court, which
is the court of last resort. The Supreme Court panel of fifteen judges
is located in Tokyo. For major cases, there is a grand panel of all the
judges, but ordinary cases are heard before a panel of five. Appeals
from the High Courts are limited to errors of law and issues of consti-
tutional interpretation, but if such errors are alleged, the party may
have an appeal of right. However, just as in the United States, patent
suits almost never reach the Supreme Court.
B. The Patent Infringement Lawsuit
When initiating a patent infringement lawsuit in Japan, the for-
eign-based patentee has many critical matters to consider: the applica-
ble substantive law, the procedural law and customs, retaining
adequate Japanese counsel, preparing for trial, and formulating a strat-
egy to obtain acceptable relief. Successfully pursuing the lawsuit will
require that all these factors be carefully considered in light of Japan's
unique legal and social structure.
1. Attempt to Negotiate Settlement
Probably the most crucial aspect of the Japanese culture and legal
system for the foreign litigant to understand is the importance of con-
ciliation. Japanese culture and history have enshrined honor and har-
mony as the cornerstones of Japanese civilization. In Japan,
determining relative rights between parties is not nearly as important
as preserving societal harmony, or wa.74 Amicable settlement of pat-
73. In the United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting
in Washington D.C., has exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals from every district court. See
supra note 11.




ent infringement litigation is more the norm than the exception75 be-
cause such formal confrontation would disrupt the wa. By pursuing
rights in court, both parties are shamed and, thus, dishonored. Settle-
ment of disputes by reaching a harmonious consensus is the prevailing
goal of both Japanese culture and the Japanese legal system. There-
fore, litigation of a patent dispute, or of any dispute for that matter, is
considered a rather extreme measure. An attempt at a negotiated set-
tlement will be taken seriously by the Japanese defendant, and often
will result in a swift and satisfactory resolution of the dispute.
Also, the Japanese courts universally encourage settlement.76
Often, the court will subtly express its opinion of how the suit will
result if it is not settled. Not surprisingly, a harmonious consensus
soon follows. The resulting settlement will likely resemble the ulti-
mate resolution had the case reached judgment, but it will have been
reached through amicable agreement of the parties, saving face for all.
2. Preparation for Trial
A key element to success in Japanese patent litigation is finding
exceptional Japanese counsel. Since this person will be integral to the
litigation, it is important to create a working relationship and to have
direct, in-depth communication with your Japanese counsel. Many
Japanese attorneys understand English, but in the interest of effective
and accurate communication, translators and written translations of
written documents should be liberally used.
Finding a Japanese attorney, or Bengoshi, who is experienced
with patent litigation is very difficult. Normally, the "patent attor-
ney," or Benrishi, who was retained to write the Japanese patent that is
the subject of dispute will not be qualified to act as trial counsel. Typ-
ically, the Benrishi is merely a patent agent who is not a member of
the Japanese Bar. Moreover, very few of the seventeen thousand at-
torneys in Japan have any expertise with patent cases. It is recom-
mended that a large corporation with on-going business in Japan keep
a qualified Bengoshi on retainer at all times. Thus, a working relation-
ship establishing familiarity with the client's patents can be initiated
with the Bengoshi prior to the litigation. The retainer arrangement
also avoids the very real problem of finding competent counsel when
litigation arises suddenly.
75. Of the 369 patent infringement cases filed in the District Court in 1990, 60 were with-
drawn, 125 reached judgment, and 157 were settled. Japanese Patent Practice: Prosecution!
Litigation, A.I.P.L.A. PRoc. K18 (June 1992).
76. Mark F. Wachter, Patent Enforcement in Japan: An American Perspective For Suc-
cess, 19 A.I.P.L.A. QJ. 59, 80 (1991).
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Expert witnesses also play an important role in patent litigation in
Japan. Although the Tokyo and Osaka special patent divisions have
the aid of technical advisors, the judges themselves typically do not
have technical backgrounds. In order to educate these judges on the
technology involved in a light most favorable to their case, many liti-
gants employ experts to conduct highly technical experiments and
submit written statements to the court. It can be advantageous to em-
ploy professors from prestigious universities such as Tokyo University
and scientists who are well respected in their field. Such highly quali-
fied experts strongly influence Japanese courts.77
Although not required, it is customary for the patentee to send a
warning letter to the infringer, prior to initiating suit, asking that the
infringing activity be stopped. Often, this letter alone will be taken
very seriously by a Japanese company and will bring about some type
of settlement. The letter is important to the Japanese because it can
potentially avoid litigation, and thus allow the infringer to "save face."
A glaring difference between Japanese civil procedure and
United States civil procedure exists in the absence of evidentiary "dis-
covery" in Japan. This presents a problem for the patentee in cases
involving process patents, where evidence of infringement is not
available through overt acts of the defendant. However, there are pro-
visions of the patent law that mitigate the absence of discovery. Japa-
nese patent law provides that if a product produced by a patented
process is novel, the defendant is presumed to have used the patented
process to produce the product.78 This provision shifts the burden of
proof, requiring the defendant to disclose its process in order to over-
come the presumption of infringement. A second provision allows the
court to order a party to produce documents in its possession when-
ever total unfairness to the other party would result if the documents
were not disclosed.79 Moreover, unlike other areas of law where lack
of discovery could render the plaintiff's case impossible to prove, evi-
dence will likely be available in patent cases, since most cases will
involve product claims. Infringement can thus be proven simply by
purchasing the defendant's products on the open market.
3. Karishobun: Temporary Relief
A Karishobun is a procedure, undertaken by a court during the
pendency of the suit, that orders a party not to carry on a specified
77. Id. at 66.
78. Patent Law, art. 104 (1959 as amended) (Japan).




activity. The plaintiff files a motion for the Karishobun, and if ex-
treme necessity for relief and a strong likelihood of infringement is
shown, the court will order the provisional relief. This procedure is
analogous to a temporary injunction in U.S. courts. In extreme cases,
the court may order that infringing goods be seized and held through
the pendency of the main suit.
Obtaining a temporary order that prevents the defendant from
continuing an infringing activity is generally difficult and time-con-
suming.s0 This is especially true in patent infringement cases, which
are frequently complicated. Nevertheless, such relief may be crucial
to protect business interests for the duration of the litigation, and fur-
ther, the granting of relief may be instrumental in speeding up the
settlement process. Moreover, because the judge presiding over the
Karishobun may also be the "judge in charge," or Shunin, of the main
lawsuit, if one is filed, success in the Karishobun may have influence
on the main action.
After considering the evidence presented at the Karishobun hear-
ing, the judge will rule on the motion. If the decision will -be adverse
to the plaintiff, the judge will typically ask the plaintiff if it would like
to withdraw the request for Karishobun. This provides the plaintiff an
opportunity to "save face."
4. Honso: The Main Lawsuit
Many acts of the defendant may constitute infringement, includ-
ing manufacture, import, use, sale, transfer, or display for sale of an
infringing product, process, or article."1 There are a number of ways
in which to that prove a product infringes. The easiest is to show that
the infringing device meets the literal wording of the patent's claims.
When the device does not literally "read on" the patent claims,
the scope of the patent may still be sufficient to encompass the device.
Prior to 1960, Japanese patent law followed the German legal theory
of extending the scope of patent protection beyond the strict limits of
the claim to the heart of the fundamental inventive concept. The 1960
revision of Japanese patent law was interpreted as adopting the Ameri-
can concept of imposing strict patent claim boundaries.8 2 Since then,
the Japanese have narrowly interpreted claims. In fact, the Doctrine of
Equivalents, which has been used in the United States to extend the
80. A Karishobun typically takes from 18 to 24 months to reach decision; however, in one
recent suit, Monsanto Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., Tokyo D.C., July 10, 1987, a provisional
injunction was obtained in only 9 months. Wachter, supra note 76.
81. Patent Law, art. 101 (Japan).
82. Ham & Ohba, supra note 71, at PL31.
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scope of claim boundaries, is only of limited influence in Japan. 83 On
occasion, the judiciary has allowed arguments based on "equivalency"
to broaden the scope of claims, as well as arguments based on "file
wrappers" and prior art to limit the patent's scope. In general, how-
ever, claim interpretation remains extremely narrow.
The reason for this narrow interpretation of patents derives from
the general philosophy of the Japanese patent system to spread tech-
nology throughout society. By limiting the scope of protection for a
patent, others are permitted to develop similar ideas.84 According to
Shoji Tada, an official at the Japanese Patent Office, exposing an in-
ventor's work to the public has helped Japanese companies "avoid the
waste of time in coming up with the same ideas."8" This clearly is at
odds with the United States patent philosophy of protecting the inven-
tor's exclusive right to the fruits of his labor. These "philosophical
differences between the U.S. and Japan[ese] patent systems will re-
main for a long time," said Akira Okawa, a former chief examiner in
the Japanese Patent Office.86 "In Japan, we have a balance between
the rights of patent holders and society. In the U.S., they don't care
about society."87
Recognizing this philosophy of the Japanese system, both Japa-
nese and American companies have adopted a policy of "cluster fil-
ing" patent applications. This procedure involves filing a myriad of
accompanying applications along with every principal application.
These accompanying applications are written to cover every conceiva-
ble variation of the principal invention. In this way, a competitor is
prohibited from obtaining a similar patent and forcing a cross-license
on the technology. Also, gaining rights to variations of the invention
effectively broadens the scope of protection beyond the narrow inter-
pretation the courts would normally give the patent. In effect, the pat-
entee protects its patent by building a wall of patents around it.
The defense to a patent infringement suit will primarily focus on
interpreting the patent's claims as not encompassing the accused de-
vice. As an alternative defense, the defendant may claim that the orig-
inal patent is invalid because of some defect in its issuance. Under
Japanese law, however, this cannot be presented as a defense in the
main lawsuit, or Honso. Instead, the validity of the patent must be
83. Robert Green Steme & Edward J. Klesser, Patent Protection for Computer-Related
Technology: An International Strategy, 292 PLI/PAT 23, 44 (1990).
84. See supra note 30.
85. Clayton Jones, U.S., Japan Closer to Pact on Patent Procedure, L.A. TIsES, Oct. 12,





challenged before the Japanese Patent Office in a "nullity" proceed-
ing. Japanese patent law gives the court discretionary power to sus-
pend the main infringement suit while the validity issue is being
resolved. The courts, however, consider the issue of validity a sepa-
rate matter, so they "uniformly reject such motions unless a patent is
finally declared invalid."88
A typical trial involves many short hearings spread out over
many months. This form of trial may be very unsettling for the lawyer
accustomed to the frantic pace and extensive hearings of American
trials. Japanese court hearings may last only ten minutes and occur as
infrequently as every three months. It is here that patience and a com-
mitment to accepting and working within the Japanese legal system is
most crucial.
Unlike a American hearing, the Japanese hearing is in practice
nothing more than a forum for the attorneys to present their written
briefs and statements to the court. Very little oral argument is
presented by the Bengoshi. Their argument is typically presented in
short two to three page briefs addressing only a narrow aspect of the
case, and most evidence is presented in the form of short written state-
ments, rather than live witnesses. Questions by the judges are typi-
cally not directly answered but rather become the subject of the next
round of briefs.89
The written nature of the Japanese trial provides a highly docu-
mented history of the case. This is especially helpful to foreign patent
owners who can clearly follow the progress of the case and maintain
control by reviewing translations of all statements. This also allows
the patent owner, who is likely the most qualified expert on the tech-
nology, to create initial drafts of written statements dealing with the
technical issues of the case.
There is no set time frame for the duration of a trial, and the
Bengoshi do not conclude the presentation of evidence. As with most
civil law systems, these hearings continue until the judges determine
that the case is ripe for decision, at which time they pass judgment,
which includes a written opinion. This judgment does not become
final, however, until after any appeal.
On the rare occasion that an infringement suit does not settle and
the court reaches a decision, the court may award damages, a perma-
nent injunction, or both. The primary remedy available to a prevailing
plaintiff is damages. The measure of damages may be either the
amount of infringer's profits, the equivalent of a reasonable royalty
88. Hara & Ohba, supra note 71, at PL28.
89. Wachter, supra note 76, at 78.
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during the period of infringement, or any actual lost profits of the
plaintiff due to the infringing sales.9" Unlike American alternatives,
multiple damages for punitive and/or deterrent purposes are not
available.
If the patentee is not actually commercially using his own patent
in Japan, the patentee can only claim damages measured by a reason-
able royalty.91 This limitation on damages, as compared to the cost of
litigation, is extremely important for the foreign patentee to keep in
mind during settlement negotiations. It may not be worth going to
trial in some cases if lost profits and court costs are not available as
rewards.92
The calculation of damages may start either from the date of pub-
lication for opposition of the patent or the actual date infringement
began, whichever is later. This provision of the Japan Patent Law has
been severely criticized in the United States because the publication
for opposition of a patent may occur years after the technology has
been "laid open," or presented, to the public. Thus, for many years
during the useful life of the technology, the inventor has no cause of
action. Although the law may not protect the patentee to the extent an
American patentee might want, the law is both equitable and sensible.
Primarily, it would be impractical to provide a cause of action
under Japan's deferred examination patent system. The purpose of the
system is to create efficiency by delaying the examination of a patent
until it is determined that the invention will be used. If the inventor
determines that working the invention would be uneconomical, he will
abandon the patent. In this way, the Japanese Patent Office is saved
the time of prosecuting a useless patent. Up to half of the applications
that are "laid open" to the public will not be published for opposi-
tion.93 If a cause of action were allowed prior to publication for oppo-
sition, this would create inequity whenever injunctions and damages
were awarded to applicants who were never issued a patent.
Secondly, the law does provide the patentee a right to compensa-
tion. If infringement occurs before the publication for opposition, but
after the patent has been "laid open" for public disclosure, the patentee
can give notice to the infringer that it is claiming a reasonable royalty
90. Patent Law, arts. 101-102 (Japan).
91. Ham & Ohba, supra note 71, at PL14.
92. This was true in the case of the damage award given to American Cyanamid in an
infringement suit against Nissan. American Cyanamid pursued its case through to an affirmative
judgment, but its remedy was limited to a reasonable royalty because it had not used the patent in
Japan. American Cyanamid Co. v. Nissan Kagakukogyo K.K., 2 Mutaiazaisan Reishu 414
(Toyama D.C., Sept. 7, 1970).
93. See generally, Hara & Ohba, supra note 71, at PL14, PL55.
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calculated from the date of such notice until publication for opposi-
tion.94 In view of the fact that up to half of the applications laid open
will not be accepted, however, this right is not enforceable until after
publication for opposition. Finally, the Japanese feel the law is a
perfectly reasonable compromise, because it provides a harmonious
balance between the sharing of technology with society and rewarding
the inventor.
A second remedy available to the court is a permanent injunction
prohibiting infringing acts. This was the remedy awarded by the To-
kyo District Court to Monsanto in a 1987 patent infringement suit
against Stauffer Chemical Company.95 There, the Tokyo District
Court broke new legal ground by holding that testing a herbicide for
Agricultural Registration, where such registration was required to sell
the product, was "use" that constituted infringement of the plaintiff's
patent. The court issued a permanent injunction that prohibited Stauf-
fer from making, using, selling, or transferring its herbicide until the
expiration of Monsanto's patent. Rather than accepting damages or a
royalty, Monsanto was able to stop its competitor's penetration into
the Japanese market through an injunction.
The ability to request the appropriate remedy, even an extension
of existing law as in the Monsanto case, is but one of the skills re-
quired of patent litigants in Japanese courts today. Working from a
foundation comprised of an understanding of the cultural, philosophi-
cal, and legal differences between the United States and Japan, Ameri-
can patent practitioners should be able to hone such litigation skills. It
is necessary for them to begin doing so immediately, as patent litiga-
tion in Japan is likely to escalate in the future.
VII. CONCLUSION
In order to remain competitive in today's global economy, every
country must actively protect its assets. Some of America's greatest
assets are its intellectual property rights, and it is crucial that they be
effectively protected from infringement. Notwithstanding the claims
of some foreigners that Japan's patent system is unfairly biased
against them, an American inventor can successfully obtain and en-
force patents in Japan. Americans face the obvious difficulties of the
language barrier, the vast cultural differences, and an unfamiliarity
with the Japanese patent system. These obstacles can be overcome.
Successful protection of American intellectual property rights in Japan
94. Patent Law, art. 65-3 (Japan).
95. Monsanto Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., Tokyo D.C., July 10, 1987.
1994]
32 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
simply requires Americans to recognize that they are foreigners in Ja-
pan. If American inventors are willing to make the effort to under-
stand the cultural underpinnings of Japanese law and practice, they
will find, contrary to popular belief, that their intellectual property can
be effectively protected in Japan.
Although the United States currently holds an advantage over Ja-
pan in the ownership of intellectual property rights, it is important for
American companies not to become dependent upon a steady stream
of royalty income. Japanese companies are working diligently to shift
the balance of ownership of patent rights in the very near future. In
addition, American companies should heed the warning of the "Nu-
clear Bomb" view of some Japanese toward patent enforcement, and
not decrease investment in manufacturing improvements in reliance
on temporary increases in royalty income. American patent practi-
tioners must arm themselves with a true understanding of the Japanese
patent system in order to win the current "Patent War," as well as




TABLE 1: LIST OF COMPAI
RANK COMPANY
I Toshiba Corp (Japan)
2 Mitsubishi Denki KK (Japan)
3 Hitachi Ltd (Japan)
4 Eastman Kodak Co
5 Canon KK (Japan)
6 General Electric
7 North American/US Philips Corp
8 Fuji Photo Film Co Ltd (Japan)
9 International Business Machines
10 Motorola Inc
11 El Du Pont de Nemours & Co
12 Bayer AG (Germany)
13 AT&T Bell Laboratories
14 Siemens AG (Germany)
15 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co
16 General Motors Corp
17 NEC Corp (Japan)
18 Ciba-Geigy Corp
19 US Navy
20 Sharp KK (Japan)
21 BASF AG (Germany)
22 Texas Instruments Inc
23 Minnesota Mining & Manufactu





29 Nissan Motor Co Ltd (Japan)
30 Dow Chemical Co
31 Hewlett-Packard Co
32 Minolta Camera KK (Japan)
33 Ricoh Co Ltd (Japan)
34 Sony Corp (Japan)
35 Hoechst AG (Germany)
36 Shell Oil Co
37 AMP Inc
38 Robert Bosch GmbH (Germany)
Brother Kogyo KK (Japan)
40 Honda Motor Co Ltd (Japan)
41 Allied-Signal
42 US Department of Energy
43 Konica Corp (Japan)




48 Toyota Jidosha Kogyo KK (Japa
49 Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd
50 Ford Motor Co








Of the top 50 Grantees of US Patents in 1991:
19 were Japanese companies, receiving 8,780 patents, and
23 were United States companies, receiving 9,881 patents.
Of the top 10 Grantees of US Patents in 1991:
5 were Japanese companies, receiving 4,528 patents, and






























































34 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10
TABLE 2: 1991 WORLDWIDE SEMICONDUCTOR MARKET SHARE 97
vs. UNITED STATES PATENT RANK9 8
MARKET US PATENT
RANK COMPANY REVENUE ($M) SHARE RANK
I NEC $4,774 8.0% 17
2 Toshiba $4,579 7.7% 1
3 Intel $4,019 6.7% -
4 Motorola $3,802 6.4% 10
5 Hitachi $3,765 6.3% 3
6 Texas Inst. $2,738 4.6% 22
7 Fujitsu $2,705 4.5% 24
8 Mitsubishi $2,303 3.9% 2
9 Matsushita $2,037 3.4% 15
10 Philips $2,022 3.4% 7
11 National Semi. $1,602 2.7% -
12 Samsung $1,473 2.5% -
13 SGS-Thompson $1,436 2.4% -
14 Sanyo $1,362 2.3% -
15 Sharp $1,318 2.2% 20
16 Siemens $1,263 2.1% -
17 AMD $1,226 2.1% -
18 Sony $1,196 2.0% 34
19 Old $981 1.6% -
20 Rohm $934 1.6% -
21 AT&T $713 1.2% 13
22 LSI Logic $670 1.1% -
23 Harris $623 1.0% -
24 Analog Devices $464 0.8% -
25 Micron Tech. $455 0.8% -
SUMMARY
Overall, Japanese companies' 1991 Market Share was 46.4%, and North American
companies' 1991 Market Share was 38.4%.
Of the top 25 Market Share Owners in 1991:
10 were Japanese companies, and
11 were North American companies.
Of the top 10 Market Share Owners in 1991:
6 were Japanese companies, and
4 were North American companies.
97. DATAQUEST FiNAL MARKET SHARE REPORT (1991). Used with permission of
Dataquest.
98. PATENT INrmaoEicE AND TEcHNOLOrY REPoRT (1991). Used with permission of
IF/Plenum Data Corporation.
